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Abstract 
This paper examines ways in which a phenomenological approach might contribute to 
space syntax research, drawing on three themes that mark the heart of 
phenomenological investigation: (1) understanding grounded in real-world experience; 
(2) human immersion in world; and (3) describing the lifeworld—a person or group’s 
everyday world of taken-for-grantedness of which the person or group is typically 
unaware. A major phenomenological question is how space syntax concepts, 
particularly the spatial configuration of the “deformed grid,” point toward a particular kind 
of place structure in which the spatial-temporal regularity of individual participants 
potentially coalesces into a larger environmental dynamic—what is termed “place 
ballet”—that both sustains and is sustained by an attachment to and a sense of place. 
Introduction 
As an outsider who greatly admires space syntax research, I am 
honored to be invited to speak at this international conference. I 
assume my invitation arose because of my participation on the space 
syntax list serve and a series of articles in which I explored potential 
connections between space syntax and phenomenology (Seamon 
1994, 2002, 2004, 2007). In this paper, I highlight a number of ways in 
which phenomenology might contribute to space syntax, both 
conceptually and empiricallyi. 
For the moment, let me define phenomenology as the careful 
description and interpretation of human experience. The focus is on 
phenomena—i.e., things or experiences as people experience those 
things or experiences. The aim is to describe any phenomenon in its 
own terms—in other words, as it is as an experience, situation, or 
event in the real lives of real human beings in real times and places. 
The goal is not idiosyncratic explication, however, but the identification 
of underlying lived structures common to many specific experienced 
instances of the phenomenon. 
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Phenomena central to space syntax include the nature of everyday 
spatial movement; the lived foundation of how, in fact, such movement 
can even happen; the ways in which people, as they move about, are 
aware or not aware of their environment and other people co-present; 
the ways in which people, as they move about, attentively encounter 
each other (or do not). Hovering beneath these themes is the central 
phenomenon of space syntax: the ways in which the particular spatial 
configuration of pathways afford particular patterns of movement and 
encounter and how those patterns, in turn, contribute to and over time 
sometimes shift pathway spatial configuration. 
As a phenomenologist, I am most interested in how these phenomena 
of space syntax might relate to a particular kind of place structure and 
situation in which the spatial-temporal regularity of individuals 
potentially coalesces into some larger environmental dynamic that 
both sustains and is sustained by an attachment to and a sense of 
place (Seamon 2007). I want to suggest here that such a place 
structure is intimated analytically through the axial grid but, as far as I 
know, has so far received little direct attention in space syntax 
research, partly because the nature of this place structure is lived and 
thus perhaps better described and understood through a 
phenomenological rather than an analytical approach.  
As a means to arrive at this particular kind of place structure—what I 
have called in other work a place ballet—I, first, lay out three central 
phenomenological themes; second, explain how my 
phenomenological work led to an interest in space syntax; and, third, 
return to the three phenomenological themes as they relate to space 
syntax and the possibility of place ballet. 
Three Phenomenological Themes 
The phenomenological perspective I represent is what has come to be 
called existential phenomenology—i.e., a way of phenomenology 
developed by such thinkers as Martin Heidegger and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty that moves away from phenomenological founder 
Edmund Husserl's focus on pure intellectual consciousness and moves 
toward a reflexive understanding of everyday human life and its lived 
meaningsii. So that I can suggest connections to space syntax research, 
I want to highlight three important themes in existential-
phenomenological research: (1) understanding grounded in real-world 
experience; (2) people immersed in world; and (3) describing and 
understanding lifeworld. Here, I describe each briefly in turn and later 
discuss connections with space syntax. 
Understanding Grounded in Experience 
Existential phenomenologists argue that, if we are to understand 
ourselves as human beings and the worlds in which we live, we must 
ground that understanding in a conception and language that arise from 
and return to human experience and meaning. There is no world 
“beneath” or “behind” the world of primordial lived experience, and 
existential phenomenologists are skeptical of any conceptual system that 
transcribes human life, actions, and experience into secondhand, 
reason-based presentations—for example, positivist-analytical accounts 
that necessarily convert experience and meaning into tangible, 
measurable units and relationships that are claimed to represent some 
empirical trace of their original lived source. Clearly, most space syntax 
research approaches its subject of study in analytical fashion, and any 
link with phenomenological study might seem conceptually 
inappropriate—a matter I’ll return to below. 
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People Immersed in World 
Human experience, awareness, and action are always intentional—i.e., 
necessarily oriented toward and finding their significance in a world of 
emergent meaning. Human beings are not just aware but aware of 
something, whether an object, living thing, idea, environmental situation, 
or the like. This ever-present quality of intentionality means that human 
beings are inescapably immersed and enmeshed in their world, and one 
central lived aspect of this immersion is what French phenomenologist 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty called “body-subject”—corporeal, prereflective 
awareness and intelligence expressed through intentional but, typically, 
unself-conscious bodily movement. Shortly, I want to address what 
peoples’ intimate melding with the world through the lived body might 
mean for space syntax. 
Describing and Understanding Lifeworlds 
The everyday structure through which this lived reciprocity unfolds is the 
lifeworld—a person or group’s day-to-day world of taken-for-grantedness 
that is normally unnoticed and therefore concealed as a phenomenon. In 
turn, the unquestioned acceptance of the things and experiences of the 
lifeworld is what phenomenologists call the natural attitude. One aim of 
existential-phenomenological study is to disclose and describe the 
various lived structures and dynamics of the natural attitude and the 
lifeworld, which always include spatial, environmental, and place 
dimensions. One of the most intriguing discoveries of space syntax 
research is the suggestion that topological structure plays a major role in 
the lived fact that a lifeworld is one way rather than another in terms of 
environmental and place experience. More on this point shortly. 
An Environmental Phenomenology 
I next want to explain how I became involved with existential 
phenomenology so that I can then connect space syntax with these 
three themes, particularly as they relate to the notions of body-subject 
and place ballet. As an environment-behavior researcher in a 
department of architecture, my main teaching and research emphasis 
relates to the nature of environmental behavior, action, and 
experience, especially in terms of the built environment. I am 
particularly interested in why places are important to people and how 
architecture and environmental design can be a vehicle for urban 
place making. 
I became involved with the nature of place and place making when I 
was working on my doctorate in behavioral geography at Clark 
University in Worcester, Massachusetts, in the 1970s. My dissertation, 
revised and published in 1979 as A Geography of the Lifeworld 
(Seamon 1979), focused on a wide-ranging phenomenon that I called 
everyday environmental experience—the sum total of peoples’ 
firsthand involvements with their everyday places, spaces, and 
environments. My source of experiential descriptions was 
environmental experience groups, small groups of volunteer 
participants who were willing to meet weekly to examine in their own 
daily experience such themes as the nature of everyday movement, 
emotions relating to place, the nature of noticing and attention, the 
meaning of home and at-homeness, places for things, deciding where 
to go when, and so forth. 
Through a phenomenological explication of some 1,500 personal 
observations offered in these environmental experience groups, I 
eventually arrived at three overarching themes—movement, rest, and 
encounter—that appeared to mark the essential core of everyday 
environmental experience. The book’s section on movement 
examined the habitual nature of everyday environmental behaviors 
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and actions, while the section on rest explored people’s attachment to 
place and gave particular attention to at-homeness and positive 
affective relationships with places and environments. The final 
section, on encounter, considered the multifaceted ways in which 
people make attentive contact with their world and identified such 
modes of awareness as watching, noticing, and more intense kinds of 
attention to the world at hand. 
Body-Subject, Time-Space Routines, and Place Ballet 
To explain how my concerns in Geography of the Lifeworld eventually 
led to an interest in space syntax, I want to summarize the book’s 
conclusions on everyday movement. One of the first themes that 
came forth in the environmental experience groups was the 
importance of habitual action in everyday life. Group observations 
suggested that, regardless of the particular environmental scale at 
which they happen, many movements are conducted by some 
preconscious impulse that guides behaviors without the person’s need 
to be consciously aware of their happening.  
Body-subject is the term that French phenomenologist Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty used in his Phenomenology of Perception to describe 
the intentional but taken-for-granted intelligence of the body.  
“Consciousness,” he wrote (Merleau-Ponty 1941/1962, pp. 138-39) “is 
being toward the thing through the intermediary of the body. A 
movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it 
has incorporated it into its ‘world’, and to move one’s body is to aim at 
things through it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call.” 
Though Merleau-Ponty said very little about larger-scale actions of 
body-subject in Phenomenology of Perception, observations from the 
environmental experience groups pointed to its versatility as 
expressed in more complex movements and behaviors extending over 
time and spaceiii. One such behavior indicated by group observations 
is what I called body routine—a set of integrated gestures, behaviors, 
and actions that sustain a particular task or aim, for example, 
preparing a meal, driving a car, doing home repair, and so forth. Also 
identified was what I labeled a  time-space routine—a set of more or 
less habitual bodily actions that extends through a considerable 
portion of time—for example, a getting-up routine or a weekday going-
to-lunch routine. 
Most pertinent to space syntax, group observations suggested that, in 
a supportive physical environment, individual time-space routines and 
body routines may fuse together in a larger time-space whole, 
creating an environmental dynamic that I called, after the earlier 
observations of urban critic Jane Jacobs (1961, p. 50), a place 
ballet—an interaction of body and time-space routines rooted in a 
particular environment, which often becomes an important place of 
interpersonal and communal exchange, meaning, and attachment.  
One ingredient of place ballet is familiarity arising from routine, since 
regular actions of individuals meet together in space, which becomes 
a place of familiarity and perhaps attachment (Seamon & Nordin 
1980). The regularity of place ballet is unintentional and only comes 
about through time and many repeated “accidental” meetings. At its 
base is the habitual force of body-subject, which supports a time-
space continuity grounded on bodily patterns of the past (ibid.). 
Group observations indicated that places founded in place ballet are 
more than locations and space to be traversed. Each comes to house 
a dynamism that has arisen naturally without directed intervention. 
These spaces take on the quality that phenomenological geographer 
Edward Relph (1976), in his seminal phenomenology of place, Place 
and Placelessness, called existential insideness—a situation in which 
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“a place is experienced without deliberate and self-conscious 
reflection yet is full with significances” (p. 55). Relph argued that 
existential insideness is the very foundation of place experience, and 
this point is echoed in place ballet. Through habitual patterns meeting 
in time and space, an environment can become a place shared by the 
people who come into spatial-temporal contact there. The dynamism 
of that place is largely in proportion to the number of people who 
share in its space and thereby create and share in its tempo and 
activity (Seamon and Nordin 1980). 
Place Ballet and Space Syntax 
A Geography of the Lifeworld was published in 1979, and at that time I 
had only a limited understanding of the way in which the world, 
particularly its physical, potentially designable qualities, might sustain 
and enhance the facility of body-subject, especially place ballet. Once 
I became a faculty member in a department of architecture in the early 
1980s, I became more involved with how qualities of physical space 
and environment might contribute to place ballet, since such 
understanding might lead to design and policy that would support 
place ballet rather than inhibit or undermine it (Seamon 1991). A 
number of studies contributed to this understanding (though none 
using an explicit phenomenological conception or language), including 
the work of Christopher Alexander (Alexander 2002-05; et al., 1977, 
1987), Jane Jacobs (1961), Oscar Newman (1973, 1980), and William 
Whyte (1980).  
Of all these studies, I became especially interested in space syntax 
research because it seemed to provide powerful conceptual and 
empirical support for the phenomenological claim of a reciprocal 
relationship between human action—i.e., everyday spatial movement—
and qualities of the physical-spatial environment—i.e., the world’s 
underlying pathway structure, or spatial configuration. Although Hillier 
and colleagues had no intentional aim to make links with a 
phenomenological perspective, I immediately recognized significant 
parallels, since space syntax appeared to demonstrate conclusively that 
human movements are always integrally enmeshed in the world, 
particularly through the particular configurational structure of a pathway 
network. To lay out more clearly some of the parallels between the 
phenomenological perspective and space syntax, I want to return to the 
three phenomenological themes I highlighted earlier and discuss them 
more fully in regard to space syntax as it might be interpreted through an 
“environmental and architectural phenomenology.” 
Understanding grounded in experience 
At first glance, one might expect the phenomenologist to oppose space 
syntax research, since its approach is largely analytical and dependent 
on various topological and mathematical concepts and procedures that 
transform the lived richness of environmental and architecture 
experiences, actions, and situations into tangible, measurable indicators 
that can be readily seen and compared numerically and graphically. For 
example, a well-used street is interpreted as a highly integrated axial 
line. Or a well used city square or piazza is interpreted as a convex 
space intersected by well integrated axial lines marking major pedestrian 
flows through that particular city district. Or what potentially might be a 
robust neighborhood place ballet is interpreted as a well shaped 
deformed grid. 
But what is admirable phenomenologically about so many of the 
analytical concepts and procedures of space syntax is that they appear 
to arise from and accurately point toward real-world aspects of 
environmental and place experience. For example, the simple but 
elegant recognition that any outdoor urban space incorporates both 
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convex and axial dimensions has immediate correspondence with a 
central tenet in environmental phenomenology—viz., that, from one 
vantage point, human life can be understood as the tension between 
movement and rest and such related lived opposites as dwelling/journey, 
home/horizon, and continuity/change (Jager 1975; Seamon 1979). 
In this sense, axial and convex spaces are an accurate analytical 
rendition of the movement/rest dialectic, they provide a simple way to 
consider how physical and spatial qualities might contribute to lived 
aspects of movement and rest. On one hand, convex space can be said 
to relate to “rest,” since the two-dimensional, “fat” quality of  convex 
space readily allows for local places—e.g., the site of a weekly market, a 
place where teenagers play soccer, or gathering spot for old people to sit 
in the sun. On the other hand, axial space relates more to the one-
dimensional, “moving” quality of open space and to a wider-scaled, 
global relationship—the way the particular spatial configuration of the 
pathway fabric lays out a potential movement field that draws people 
together or keeps them apart and also assists or hinders newcomers as 
they attempt to get around an unfamiliar place. 
Both convex and axial spaces can involve co-presence, co-awareness, 
informal interpersonal encounters, and robust place activity; and both 
aspects of urban space no doubt both contribute, but in somewhat 
different ways, to the physical foundation of place ballet. Experientially 
and phenomenologically, it is probably the case that the kind of place 
ballet arising out of axial-space structure—e.g., the deformed grid—is 
different in its spatial and temporal dynamics than kind of place ballets 
associated with convex spaces. 
Ultimately, in a robust urban district, one might expect to find a nesting of 
place regularity that ranges from interior “third places” (e.g., cafés and 
pubs) to regular outdoor events linked to spaces working in a convex 
way (e.g., a weekly flea market) to the more amorphous place ballets of 
sidewalks and streets, the lively activity of which is generated largely 
through qualities of axial space and a well-formed deformed grid (Read 
& Budiarto 2003). This nested quality of urban place founded in pathway 
structure reminds me of Jane Jacobs’ contention that the best-working 
street neighborhoods 
have no beginnings and ends setting them apart as distinct units. The 
size even differs for different people from the same spot, because some 
people range farther, or hang around more, or extend their street 
acquaintance farther than others. Indeed, a great part of the success of 
these neighborhoods… depends on their overlapping and interweaving, 
turning the corners (Jacobs 1961, 120). 
My larger point here is that space syntax research has developed a 
remarkable range of concepts and measures, many of which seem to 
arise from and reflect environmental actions and experiences. Granted, 
most of these concepts and measures are reductive renditions of the 
lifeworld situations that found the analytical categories and portraits, and 
one request I have is phenomenological studies that explore the lived 
aspects of axial spaces, depth, shallowness, the deformed grid, and so 
forth—more on that below. 
I also repeat here a request I made a while back on the space syntax list 
serve: That someday Hillier, Hanson, and other key space syntax figures 
write a detailed historical account of how space syntax theory and its 
various concepts and methods arose, since they are such a powerful 
example of analytical research that serves to allow the phenomenon to 
emerge (rather than to distort, misrepresent, or arbitrarily correlate, as so 
much analytical work typically seems to do). 
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In Social Logic of Space, Hillier and Hanson (1984) claim that the 
empathy and accuracy of their concepts and measures arose because 
they were “trying to describe an order that is already present in the 
system” (p. 45). I agree with this characterization and would like to know 
more about how they came to see that order and how they came to mark 
out an interconnected conceptual system of which so many of the parts 
seem to really interrelate, shed bright light on each other, and arise from 
the realm of lived environmental and place experience. Thoughtful, 
thorough accounts of the genesis and stages in this creative discovery 
process would say much about a phenomenology of seeing and 
understanding as well as a phenomenology of architectural and urban 
place. 
Human Beings Immersed in World 
From a phenomenological vantage point, one of the most powerful 
aspects of space syntax is the way it demonstrates that everyday 
environmental movement and action are intentional in the sense of a 
lived synchronicity between human movement and the pathway 
structure through which that movement unfolds. I would argue that a 
phenomenological perspective says much about the experiential 
foundation of this lived synchronicity by pointing out that, typically, the 
person traverses the environment in a way that is unself-consciously 
intentional in that there is no question that, through the moving, the body 
will get to where it needs to go. The urban environment is normally a 
tacit context providing the taken-for-granted sidewalks, paths, and 
streets that deliver the person to his or her destination more or less 
automatically. 
As I’ve already explained, this taken-for-granted fit between human 
movement and world is interpreted phenomenologically in terms of 
bodily intentionality or what Merleau-Ponty identified as body-subject—
the lived ability of the body to move intelligently and thus act as a special 
kind of subject expressing awareness in a pre-conscious way usually 
described by such words as “mechanical,” or “habitual.” 
In the natural attitude, we are rarely aware of body-subject, since its 
actions usually meld with the environment at hand, and we have the 
freedom to get on with the more significant events of daily life. In terms 
of intentionality, it is crucial to understand that the knowledge of body-
subject is a knowledge that is only forthcoming in effort of the movement, 
which in turn is only forthcoming because of an already-learned bodily 
knowledge of the physical world in which the movement unfolds. As 
Merleau-Ponty (1941/1962, p. 144) makes the point: “It is knowledge in 
the [body], which is forthcoming only when bodily effort has been made, 
and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort.” In this sense, 
body-subject is the lived foundation of the geographical lifeworld. 
I want to emphasize that body-subject is not an arbitrary, intellectually-
generated concept but a simple, lived aspect of all human beings’ lives 
normally given no attention at all but working at a wide range of bodily 
and environmental scales—e.g., the easy flow of my hand writing as it 
marks out letters and words; the tacit awareness by which arms reach 
for dishes in the drying rack and automatically set them in their right 
place in the cupboard; the unquestioned ease with which I walk between 
my home and work place each day. In each case, intentional bodily 
movements smoothly mesh with the world at hand, illustrating, from a 
phenomenological perspective, one lived dimension of human-
immersion-in-world. 
I believe it very important for all researchers interested in way finding 
and spatial behavior to become self-consciously aware in his or her own 
everyday experience of the web of intentionality fusing body-subject and 
world. For example, move a thing that has a place to a different place, or 
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make the effort to travel to a usual destination by a route different than 
usual. The aim is carefully to observe and record the resulting 
experiences and to ask what bodily intelligibility in relation to 
environment might mean for an understanding of way finding and spatial 
behavior iv. 
In examining the space syntax literature, I’ve noticed that in the last few 
years there has been considerable effort to draw links among space-
syntax structures, way finding, and environmental cognition, whether 
through quantitative correlational relationships (Hillier & Iida 2005), 
virtual simulations of way finding (Conroy 2000), research subjects’ 
learning to traverse a real-world environment (Haq & Zimring 2003), or 
space-syntax reinterpretations of cognitive mapping (Dalton & Bafna 
2005). For example, Hillier (2005, p. 9) concludes that “topological and 
geometric intuitions are used by human minds to form pictures of the 
complex spatial networks in cities.” 
As a phenomenologist, one problem I have with this effort to link mental 
structures and environmental actions is that the supposed connection 
may largely be beside the point in terms of much real-world everyday 
environmental experience. Regardless if whether the representational 
process is Euclidean or topological, any cognitive approach assumes 
that individuals moving through the city draw on some sort of cerebral 
representation or awareness as a means to find their way. People are 
likened to navigators and are assumed to use navigational elements and 
devices, whether visual elements, least distance, fewest turns, paths of 
least angle, visual elements, or an internal topographical grid, to 
consciously decipher where they are in relation to where they wish to be 
and move accordingly. 
As both way-finding (e.g., Golledge, R. G. 1999) and space-syntax (e.g., 
Conroy 2000, Haq & Zimring 2004) studies have demonstrated, there is 
no doubt that a mode of conscious environmental attention is important 
when a person is learning a new environment and literally “finding his or 
her way,” but this situation of environmental novelty is perhaps better 
articulated and understood in lifeworld terms as a particular mode of 
place experience—what Edward Relph (1976) identifies as behavioral 
insideness—i.e., a situation involving a deliberate attending to place as it 
can be represented consciously as some set of objects, views, 
relationships, or activities. Way finding is an integral part of behavioral 
insideness in that, through efforts and actions over time, the person 
figures out how particular paths, districts, landmarks, and other 
environmental elements cohere into one place, either through some 
stepwise route imaging or some path-grounded topological imaging. 
As I explained earlier, however, people in their everyday taken-for-
granted places mostly exist in existential insideness—that mode of place 
experience in which the environment is only occasionally an object of 
cognitive attention and is much more often just a tacit medium through 
which the person’s lived body moves easily and automatically. In other 
words, the lived grounding of everyday movement is only minimally 
some sort of cognitive mapping and much more regularly the non-
discursive synchronicity of habitual body in tune with physical world. 
Merleau-Ponty (1941/1962, p. 130) clarifies this body-world coupling 
well when he describes his own bodily mastery of his apartment: “My 
flat is, for me, not a set of closely associated images. It remains a 
familiar domain round about me only as long as I still have ‘in my 
hands’ or ‘in my legs’ the main distances and directions involved, and 
as long as from my body intentional threads run out towards it.” It is 
this same unselfconscious awareness “in the hands” and “in the legs,” 
extended over wider spatial and temporal scales, which is the lived 
foundation of our everyday bodily actions, from the placing of a cup on 
its proper shelf in the cupboard to the daily walk to work that includes 
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stopping for a to-go coffee at the nearby café to the weekly drive to 
the organic supermarket. 
Some cognitive scientists, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological insights, have recognized the importance of bodily 
intentionality in human decision and actionv (Gibbs 2006). Analytically, 
the question is asked as to the relative role of cognition and body, and 
some cognitive scientists have sought to integrate the significance of 
bodily intentionality through what has come to be called “embodied 
cognition” (Gibbs 2006) or an “enactive approach”—in other words, 
the claim that the human mind understands the world only by virtue of 
the way the body can act relative to it (Ellis 2006). As cognitive 
scientist Raymond Gibbs (2006, p. 9) makes the point:  
We must not assume cognition to be purely internal, symbolic, 
computational, and disembodied, but seek out the gross and 
detailed ways that language and thought are inextricably shaped by 
embodied action. 
Hillier (2005, p. 5) may be correct when he suggests that this 
embodied-mind perspective can “free our understanding of the 
relations between minds, bodies and world” from “the conceptual 
frameworks imposed by society and by science,” particularly if central 
phenomenological notions like bodily intentionality are recast in 
scientific terms. As a phenomenologist originally trained in analytical 
social science, I have no argument with such reformulation as long as 
it is clearly grounded in lifeworld experience. 
I emphasize, however, that such a lived reformulation of 
“environmental getting about” may need to dispatch cognitive 
processes to a less significant role because the undercurrent of body-
subject is so pervasive in directing everyday life. One productive 
avenue might be a phenomenology of attention and the lived ways 
that it draws or does not draw people into a bond of awareness with 
the world in which they find themselves. 
In A Geography of the Lifeworld, I identified, besides movement and 
rest, a third lived component of environmental experience that I 
termed encounter—any situation of attentive contact between person 
and the world. Observations from the environmental experience 
groups indicated that, much of the time, we have no self-conscious 
attention directed to the world at hand with the result that we are 
oblivious and more attuned to internal goings-on such as imaginings, 
feelings, worries, bodily states, and the like. At other times, our 
attention is attracted by some thing or event in the world and we 
become caught up in that experience—for example, watching a 
talented street performer or taking in the beauty of the plantings in a 
handsomely designed plaza. But very little of the time do we 
encounter the world through the directed attention that cognition 
assumes and requires, nor do we often draw on that cognition for 
everyday needs and situations, including environmental orientation 
and way findingvi. 
Describing and Understanding Lifeworld 
Last, I want to comment on the potential links between space syntax and 
the third phenomenological theme—describing and understanding the 
lifeworld. In our daily life, we normally give little reflexive attention to what 
our world is or how moment-to-moment experience unfolds. Concealed 
by the natural attitude, the lifeworld is just there, taken-for-granted, with 
situations, events, and experiences just happening. There is normally no 
explicit consideration as to why experience happens as it does, whether 
it could happen differently, or of what larger lived structure the happening 
of experience might be a part. In this sense, the lifeworld is out of sight 
as a phenomenon, and a major aim of phenomenological investigation is 
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to make the lifeworld, natural attitude, and their taken-for-grantedness an 
object of direct scholarly attention. 
One integral aspect of the lifeworld is place and emplacement, which 
have become a major research focus in environmental and architectural 
phenomenology (Casey 1994, 1996; Malpas 1999, 2006; Mugerauer 
1994; Relph 1976, 1981; Seamon 1993, 2000, 2007; Seamon & 
Mugerauer 1985, Stefanovic 2000). Always and already, people find 
themselves in place—always and already given over to and involved 
with the things, persons, and situations that both arise from and afford 
that place. Heideggerian philosopher Jeff Malpas  explains that to be a 
human being is to be “‘placed’ in a certain way, and, typically, such 
‘placing’ involves an orientation such that one’s surroundings are 
configured in a particular way and in a particular relation to oneself—just 
as one is also related in a particular way to those surroundings…. We 
find ourselves already in a situation, already living a certain life, already 
given over to a particular existence—and as such we find ourselves 
already involved with things, already engaged in a world” (Malpas 2006, 
p. 40, p 43). 
As is demonstrated in both research and practice, space syntax offers a 
striking picture of how the physical world—specifically, its configurational 
qualities—contributes to place experience and place making, particularly 
the discovery that the relative place vitality of an urban district or city 
appears to be grounded in a particular pathway structure that Hillier calls 
the deformed grid (e.g., Hillier 1996, ch. 4). Analytically, the physical core 
of this grid is the most integrated pathways—i.e., those that have many 
other pathways feeding into them and thus the potential for being alive 
with street activity, public life, and commerce. In between are segregated 
pathways that have few or no other pathways feeding into them and are 
thus potentially less active with street life and more often residential 
pockets of seclusion and quiet. 
Hillier (1996, p. 171) appears to demonstrate conclusively that most 
urban pathway systems have traditionally been an integrated fabric of 
smaller deformed grids usually associated with identifiable 
neighborhoods and districts, the most integrated pathways of which 
interlock to form a much larger deformed grid that sustained the 
robustness of the city as a whole. He also points out that 20th-century 
urban design and planning regularly replaced integrated pathway 
configurations with treelike systems of segregated pathways that 
destroyed the intimate relationship between local and global integration. 
The long-term result is that these “spatial designs create serious lacunas 
in natural movement,” which in turn undermines the informal sociability 
of streets and neighborhoods and may in time attract “anti-social uses 
and behaviors” (ibid., p. 178). 
From a place ballet perspective, Hillier’s critique of modernist design and 
planning suggests that the possibility of individual habitual bodies easily 
coming together in co-presence has been greatly compromised because 
the particular pathway configuration does not channel the movements of 
many people into and along more integrated pathways. In other words, 
pathway structure holds habitual bodies apart rather than brings them 
together. Bodies that otherwise might belong together if they could 
present themselves to each other physically—a situation that the 
deformed grid readily affords—are separated and cannot meet in the 
everyday, taken-for-granted co-presence and encounter founded in the 
tacit ease of bodily regularity. There is much less chance for what 
humanistic geographer Yi-Fu Tuan has called a field of care—i.e., a 
place that comes to be known affectionately through prolonged, 
recurring, interpersonal exchanges and experiencevii (Tuan 1974). 
The ways that the lived belonging-in-place is sustained by the deformed 
grid’s bringing people together along pathways is perhaps the most 
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significant and intriguing insight that space syntax offers environmental 
phenomenology. Belonging, here, no doubt has a range of lived 
possibilities, but a core phenomenon would be the ways in which people, 
meeting together in co-presence, become attuned to each other and 
their place through various modes of encounter. I can imagine, for 
example, a phenomenologically-inspired space-syntax study of real-
world neighborhoods in terms of who encounters whom in what way and 
how often and how these encounters contribute to participants’ place 
attachment and to the ambience of the place. I can also imagine a 
phenomenologically-inspired space-syntax computer game that would 
allow players to manipulate pathway configuration, functions, densities, 
and human characters to simulate virtual neighborhoods that are 
bustling with street life or empty and dead. What a learning tool to 
demonstrate the significant relationship between physical design and 
human life! 
Rightly, Hillier (1996, p. 151) has criticized much of the research and 
design focusing on place and place making as involving a one-point 
perspective that speaks to “the local and apparently tractable at the 
expense of the global and intractable in cities.” He is also absolutely 
correct when he emphasizes that “[p]laces are not local things” but 
“moments in large-scale things, the large-scale things we call cities” 
(ibid.). 
Ironically, in his 2005 Proceedings article on phenomenology and social 
physics, Hillier (2005) uses this localist criticism to argue that a 
phenomenological approach will never be able to understand cities 
holistically because they can be experienced “only a part at a time” (ibid., 
p. 6). He explains: “Because phenomenologists are preoccupied with 
experience, they are by definition preoccupied with the parts, and seem 
satisfied with [an abstracted] picture of the physical whole” (ibid.). The 
result, he suggests, is that phenomenology can offer no account of the 
lived structure of the deformed grid nor of the singularity of ambience 
that makes a particular city or urban district distinctive. As he explains, 
The defining dimension of our urban experience is of how the parts 
form some kind of complex whole. This is what we mean when we 
say ‘Boston’ or ‘London’ or ‘Sidney’. The greatest phenomenological 
puzzle about the city is perhaps what we mean by these names 
(ibid., p. 6). 
I hope I have demonstrated that, in fact, Hillier is mistaken here and that 
the notion of place ballet demonstrates one potential means by which a 
phenomenological approach might explore and identify a lived place 
structure that is both local and global in its dynamics and results. In vital 
urban neighborhoods and districts, as I pointed out earlier, there are 
probably multiple nestings and overlaps of places and place ballets that 
range from the daily goings-on of “third places” (Oldenburg 1989) to the 
sidewalk encounters of neighborhood regulars to the serendipitous 
appearance of outsiders passing through the neighborhood on their way 
to somewhere else (Jacobs 1961). More than likely, the deformed grid is 
a foundation for this intricate web of connections among people and 
people and people and place. In turn, this web both affords and is 
afforded by a particular district character, ambience, and sense of place 
(Vaughan 2006). 
In sum, as illustrated schematically in figure 1, there is a threefold, 
mutually sustaining structure of urban place marked by: (1) topological 
and functional qualities; (2) lived qualities, including place ballets, 
grounded in and arising from peoples’ actions and encounters in and 
with place; and (3) a particular environmental and place ambience 
typically associated with a particular place name (e.g., “East Village,” 
“Soho,” “San Francisco,” or “London”). The analytical-topological tools of 
space syntax offer extraordinary assistance for laying out the physical 
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Figure 1. Lived Relationships among Physical City, People, & Place
Topological & Functional 
Qualities
•Spatial configuration
Convex spaces
Interface map
Axial spaces
Axial map
Integration & other measures
Deformed grid
Physical & visual permeability
Natural movement
Virtual community
Functional diversity (mixture of primary & 
secondary uses—Jacobs 1961)
Range of building types (Jacobs 1961)
Appropriate density (Jacobs 1961)
Responsive environment (Bentley 1985)
Lived Qualities: People-
Immersed-in-Place
•Body-subject
Body routines
Time-space routines
Nested place ballets
Indoor place ballets (e.g., 3rd
places—Oldenburg 1989)
Indoor-outdoor place ballets
Convex-space place ballets
Shorter-segment-axial place 
ballets
Weblike-axial place ballets
“eyes on street” (Jacobs 1961)
Fields of care (Tuan 1974)
existential insideness (Relph 
1976)
Lived Qualities: 
Environment as Place
•Neighborhood character
District sense of place
Environmental robustness & 
well being
Place ambience & uniqueness
Environmental singularity
Wholeness & life (Alexander 
2002-05)
City’s genius loci (Norberg-
Schulz 1980)
groundings of these structures and relationships just as a 
phenomenological approach provides one means for probing these 
structures and relationships as they illuminate human experiences-in-
place and genius loci, both locally and globally. Most broadly, I’m 
suggesting that urban vitality can be understood in terms of a synergistic 
commingling among physical world, people, and place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Lived Hermetic of People and Place 
I’ve titled this paper “the lived hermetic of people and place” by which I 
mean the everyday way in which human beings are intimately and 
inescapably conjoined with the world in which they find themselves. 
What is analytically thought of as two—people and world—is existentially 
understood as one—being-in-world. From a phenomenological 
perspective, space syntax is such an invaluable theory and method 
because it provides a conceptual and analytical language to identify and 
understand ways in which spatial configuration contributes to particular 
lived modes of being-in-the-world. In turn, phenomenological studies 
grounded in a space-syntax perspective might offer helpful accounts of 
the experiential structures and situations of these lived modes, 
particularly as they facilitate place making and place. Hillier (2005, p. 12) 
has described the potential result well when he says that we might much 
better understand “the full richness and diversity of human experience of 
the environment.” 
Figure 1: 
Lived relationships among 
physical city, people and 
place 
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i. In the last few years, there has been some discussion by space syntax practitioners of the contribution that phenomenology 
might offer space syntax (Hillier 2005, Turner 2003, Read & Budiarto 2003). Hillier (ibid., p. 4) claims that a phenomenological 
approach seeks “to show how the physical city is reflected in human experience and behavior.” He contrasts this “humanistic” aim 
with the “scientific” aim of what he calls social physics—the study of “how the physical city both embodies and shapes the human 
city” (ibid.). He argues that space syntax offers a conceptual and applied way to bridge phenomenological and analytical 
understandings of the city through the structures and dynamics of spatial configuration. I shall say more about Hillier’s 
presentation of phenomenology as the paper proceeds. 
ii. 2. For reviews of phenomenological research on environmental and architectural themes, see Graumann 2002; Seamon 2000. 
iii. 3. Useful efforts to relate body-subject to larger environmental scales include Allen 2005, Hill 1985, Toombs 1995. Grasping 
the nature of body-subject intellectually is difficult because it is pre-reflective and thus non-representational. Keeping (2006, p. 
181) provides a helpful portrait of bodily movement at the scale of room that can be generalized to larger-scaled environmental 
movements, including pathway behaviors: “[I]n navigating a room full of obstacles while consumed with some intellectual 
problem, the things in our path are not thematized for consciousness, we are not aware of them in any clear or articulate way, yet 
we are able to avoid them without difficulty. This is because they are present to us in a motile way, to our motor body, as 
permutations of the motor field of our being. The room presents to our motor body a field of possibilities, for movement or 
obstruction, freedom or constriction. We do not navigate it by reproducing a map or representation of it ‘in our heads,’ but by 
interacting with it in a dynamic way and feeling the ongoing relationship between the objects in the room and our body as it 
changes from moment to moment. Nor are these possibilities experienced as neutral possibilities, each one exchangeable for the 
other. Instead they are felt as ‘affective vectors,’ pushes and pulls of varying affective tone….” 
Note here Keeping’s suggestion that integral to this “motor body” is an affective awareness that in Geography of the Lifeworld 
(Seamon 1979) I termed “feeling-subject.” This affective strand of intentionality may say much about why and how people 
establish emotional attachment to place and why environmental phenomenology often evokes the notion of genius loci—sense of 
place (Norberg-Shulz 1980). 
iv. 4. We so much take for granted the intentionality of body-subject and its actions that its presence and dynamics are entirely 
out of sight in daily living, except when body-subject and the world at hand go “out of kilter” in some way—for example, our route 
to a favorite place is closed because of road construction and we must go another way. In this sense, body-subject is the lived 
foundation of what Martin Heidegger calls “readiness-to-hand—a situation whereby one’s relation to the world is established 
through use, thus meaning is gained through everyday living (Relph 1985, pp. 17-18). As the opposite of readiness-to-hand, 
Heidegger speaks of “presence-to-hand”—a situation whereby one’s relationship to the world is established by conscious 
attention and the world thus becomes an explicit object of attention. Heidegger argued that readiness-to-hand is more primary to 
human existence than presence-to-hand because readiness-to-hand is required to live. 
In space syntax, the deformed grid could be considered as one aspect of “environmental readiness-to-hand”—i.e., the situation 
where, just by a particular pathway configuration’s being what it is, a particular pattern of movements (Hillier’s natural movement), 
co-presence, and co-awareness (virtual community) unfold. Space syntax research indicates that, traditionally, there was a kind 
of unself-conscious environmental readiness-to-hand of settlement pathway structure that fit that settlement’s lifeworld like the 
intimate fit between hand and glove. One of the great questions of our time is whether that place/people intimacy of the past can 
be recreated self-consciously, through knowledgeable planning and design. Space syntax offers much in finding a practical 
answer to this question and, already, its diagnostic and design-planning achievements are impressive. See the space syntax 
website at: www.spacesyntax.com/. 
v. 5. Ellis (2006, pp. 37-38) explains well how philosophers and cognitive scientists lost sight of and then rediscovered Merleau-
Ponty’s emphasis on bodily intentionality: “During the generation after Merleau-Ponty’s death [in 1961], his self-organizational 
approach, with its emphasis on grounding cognition in the body’s motility, was largely abandoned by neuroscientists and cognitive 
psychologists in favor of a mechanical and reductionistic framework. Information processing was now viewed as a passive 
receiving of input from the environment rather than as an understanding based on the action affordances of the environment. 
Consciousness was regarded as a final step in the processing stream, a causally irrelevant spinoff or byproduct… Philosophers 
of mind and cognitive theorists became obsessed with the computer metaphor and with an insistence on reducing ‘the mental’ to 
something scientifically (and ‘physically’) explainable. As is now well known, the resulting computational model of mind viewed 
consciousness as merely an epiphenomenon of unconscious computational processes in the brain. For a generation of 
traditionally oriented neurophilosophers and scientists, the attempt to understand those aspects of experiential systems such as 
human minds that are not analogous to computer functioning, or to billiard-ball mechanical systems, got swept under the rug…. 
“Phenomenologists were skeptical of the supposedly mechanical aspects of the non-conscious substrates emphasized by 
computationalists, and therefore shied away from neuroscience altogether. But the vast phenomenon of consciousness itself was 
too important for psychology to ignore, and thus was bound to re-emerge sooner or later. In order to do so, it had to be 
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understood in a new way—a way not dominated by a mechanical billiard-ball conceptualization, with its clunky attempts to 
accommodate the problem of intentional representation within a naïve empiricist epistemology (and consequently 
incommensurable languages describing the subjective and objective dimensions). For the first time in over a century, 
neurophysiology and cognitive psychology are again becoming phenomenology-friendly.” 
vi. 6. Even when we are oblivious to the world at hand, there is still present the pre-conscious perceptual awareness of body-
subject—basic contact, as I called it in Geography of the Lifeworld (Seamon 1979, ch. 15). Basic contact is the pre-reflective 
perceptual facility of body subject, working in tandem with the body, helping to assure that its movements are in phase with the 
world at hand. The result is a continuous moment-to-moment reciprocity, whereby basic contact assists movement that, in turn, 
brings about a new perceptual field. 
On the relationship among body-subject, attention, place, and technology, especially cyberspace, see Moores 2006; Seamon 
2006. 
vii. 7. In terms of lifeworld dynamics, it is not entirely clear how or why the pattern of physical movement generated by the 
deformed grid contributes to the larger environmental phenomenon of “lively district.” One conjecture offered by Steadman (2005, 
p. 484) is that, practically, to save time, effort, and resources, people take the easiest routes, where  “easiest” typically refers to 
physical convenience, sometimes in terms of shortest distance but perhaps more often in terms of connectedness and 
permeability. Large number of shortest paths run through the web marked out by the most integrated pathways in a specific 
urban district, thus along stretches of those most integrated pathways people in that district move and meet. 
Certainly, such geographical convenience and connectedness may be necessary for transforming a physical environment into a 
working place, but the equally important phenomenological question is whether and how the physical togetherness of individual 
participants leads to communal attachment and place ambience. In short, how and why physical togetherness can become 
existential belonging. 
Jane Jacobs (1961, p.129) argues that urban place identity is dependent on everyday use and place-to-place differences: “Most 
of us identify with a place in the city because we use it, and get to know it reasonably intimately. We take our two feet and move 
around in it and come to count on it. The only reason anyone does this much is that useful or interesting or convenient differences 
fairly near by exert an attraction. Almost nobody travels willingly from sameness to sameness and repetition to repetition, even if 
the physical effort required is trivial. Differences, not duplications, make for cross-use and hence for a person’s identification with 
an area greater than his [or her] immediate street network.” 
Jacobs’ brilliant work can fairly be called an implicit phenomenology of the city and urban experience (Seamon 1991). Her 
account of the street ballet is particularly good in delineating what natural movement and lively streets can lead to in terms of 
neighborhood lifeworld, particularly the possibility of local responsibility and self-government. In this regard, she identifies three 
everyday functions of robust streets: (1) “to weave webs of public surveillance and thus to protect strangers as well as [locals]”; 
(2) “to grow networks of small-scale, everyday public life and thus of trust and social control; and (3) “to help assimilate children 
into reasonably responsible and tolerant city life” (ibid., p. 119). 
One important project is a synthesis of Jacobs and Hillier’s understandings of what the city is and how it works. Vaughan’s study 
of the London suburban town of Borehamwood is an instructive effort to synthesize space-syntax and place perspectives in a 
real-world context (Vaughan 2006). Organized in a way similar to the structure of Christopher Alexander’s “pattern language” 
approach, Responsive Environments (Bentley et al. 1985) is one useful model for urban design as place making and, through its 
emphasis on physical and visual permeability, incorporates a space-syntax perspective, albeit in a somewhat simplified fashion. 
 
 
 
 
